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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
VIOLA FOGLE WILSON,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
-

v.-

Case No. 8434

MARCEL FEUX WILSON,

Defendant and Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On March 21, 1955, plaintiff filed an action for divorce on
the ground of mental .cruelty, after having been married to
defendant ever since the lOth day of March, 1940. Thereupon
and in due time defendant filed his answer and counterclaim
also alleging mental ·cruelty as a ground for divorce. Plaintiff
replied to the counter claim and after obtaining leave of Court
filed an amended complaint alleging specific acts of ·cruelty.
The plaintiff served defendant with written interrogatories
which, inter alia, asked defendant what ·conduct on her part
had destroyed any love and affection between the parties as
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charged in defendant's answer to plaintiffs amended complaint.
(R.l4) Defendant answered the question in substance by stating plaintiff has procured an abortion and had refused to
have any children.
This case was tried in Farmington, September 15, 1955,
before the Hon. John F. Wahlquist, Judge of the Second Judicial
District.
The evidence showed that for fifteen years plaintiff and
defendant lived happily together without any serious trouble;
that they never separated (Tr.15); that from time to time defendant sent little remembrances and love notes to plaintiff until
shortly before the 13th day of March, 1955; On or about the
13th day of March, 1955, plaintiff and defendant had been out
to dinner with friends (Tr.4); that defendant was unable to sleep
and plaintiff, upon inquiring was told by defendant that he
had fallen in love with one Phyllis Moll and that he wanted a
divorce in order that he might marry Mrs. Moll. This latter
testimony was corroborated by defendant himself when on cross
examination he stated that he anticipated marrying Mrs. Moll
(Tr.51), that Mrs. Moll had obtained a divorce on March 22nd,
1955 (Tr.52), and that she was living in the rental unit of defendant's home and that defendant was keeping her. (Tr.53)
The evidence further showed that plaintiff had gone to the
doctor concerning the fact that they had not had children; that
she had had a tubular pregnancy which required an emergency
operation and thereafter there were no children, although she
had not avoided having children (Tr.34); that she in fact wanted
a family. Plaintiff and defendant testified that during the
fifteen years of their marriage plaintiff and defendant had varSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ious degrees of financial success and that defendant had earned
from $80.00 per month up to the time of the divorce when he
left his employment as a hair stylist to sell real estate; that in
the short time before the divorce he earned approximately
$300.00. The Court found defendant capable of earning $250.00
to $300.00 per month (Tr.55-Findings).
On the other hand plaintiff testified that she was in poor
health and incapable of working (Tr.ll); that she is forty five
years of age and knows no profession or occupation with which
to maintain herself.
The Court awarded to plaintiff judgment in the sum of
$5,000.00 payable at the rate of $50.00 per month without
interest, in lieu of alimony, stating that "said sum is intended as
a portion of the allocation of property to the plaintiff and shall
be .a charge upon the estate of defendant as to any balance
that should remain should he die prior to the full payment
thereof." (Tr.33)
In addition the Court awarded to plaintiff both pieces of
real property, together with the furniture therein, subject to
any encumbrances existing.
The moneys of the parties were accounted for, plaintiff
showing that she lived on the bank account from ~the
separation until the time of the decree without
· · who
was then courting Mrs. Moll, paying her anything. The money
from uranium stock was turned over to defendant's counsel
after deducting from said amount plaintiff's counsel fees.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS

Under the smog of verbosity appellant alleges but one
point on appeal:

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN MAKING ITS PROPERTY AWARD TO RESPONDENT.

ARGUMENT

This Court early decided in Reed vs. Reed, 28 Utah 297,
78 P. 675. (1904} that:
"The awarding of alimony and fixing the amount thereof
are questions the determination of which rests within
the sound discretion of the bial court; and, unless it
is rru1de to appear that there 1ws been an abuse of discretion on the part of the Court in dealing with one or
both of these questions, its judgment and orders granting and fixing the alirrwny wiU not be disturbed. In
determining these questions the amount of property
owned by the husband, his capabilities and opportunities for earning money, the health of each, and their
respective ages, the station in life in which the wife has
been accustomed to live, and the amount and kind of
her own property, will be taken into consideration by
the Court." (Emphasis added.}
1

In the case of Blair c. Blair, 40 Utah 306, 121 P.19 (1912),
this doctrine was reaffirmed. Again, in Adamson v. Adamson
55 Utah 544, 188 P. 635 (1920), the Court held, ..the granting
or withholding of alimony in divorce proceeding is a matter
within the sound discretion of the Court."
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In Pinney v. Pinney, 66 Utah 612, 245 P. 329 (1926) the
Court also held: "The division of property in a matter that rests
largely within the sound discretion of the trial Court. Unless
it appears from the finding that the division made is not equitable under all the circumstances of the case, an appellate Court
could not and will not disturb the order of the trial Court."
In the case at bar the only issue is therefore whether or
not the trial Court did or did not aJbuse its discretion in awarding the property to plaintiff in the manner in which it did.
In deciding this matter of the division of the property the
Court gave it very careful consideration and made the ruling
in view of all the circumstances. (See page 57 of transcript.)
No permanent award of alimony was made so that defendant, who is an able-bodied man- when he wants to be- will
be able to take his new bride without the burden of maintaining his old one. Thus he can in one hundred convenient
monthly installments completely shed the responsibility created
by a marriage of fifteen successful and happy years and acquire
a new wife in much the same fashion as he might shed his old
clothes for newer ones.
It was established that plaintiff had never worked, but
had devoted her entire time and efforts to making a home for
defendant. Defendant, on the other hand, consistent with
his proven lack of character, desires to participate in the propties without being required to support plaintiff at all.

There can be no argument that plaintiff was and is blameless for what occurred and normally defendant would find
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himself under the obligation of permanent alimony. ·In this
case, however, defendant is not satisfied with merely taking
fifteen years of this plaintiff's life, but now claims he should
avoid alimony, which he did and in addition have what property the parties have received during their marriage. This indeed would be a classic illustration of the wandering male's
being able to successfully eat his cake and have it too.
We should like to call the Court's attention to this division
of the property which defendant claims was such an abuse of the
trial Court's discretion. Plaintiff received the small home on
3rd West Street in Salt Lake City, purchased originally for not
more than $2700.00 (Tr.l4) which even on today's inflated
market, is worth very little either as commercial property or
as a desirable homesite. The home in Bountiful was awarded
to plaintiff subject to a mortgage in the sum of $9,352.74 which
plaintiff must assume. (Tr.lO.) The furniture in the home had
very little resale value. In addition plaintiff will be required
to pay taxes and upkeep on these properties with defendant
only paying $50.00 per month for the next eight years. This is
not subject to any modification by the Court as indicated by
the decree.
Plaintiff also received the balance of the bank account
which was practically spent by plaintiff to maintain herself from
the time defendant left home to seek his new matrimonial
pursuit until the time of trial. During that time he paid
plaintiff no alimony at all and now wants a division of that
money on which plaintiff maintained herself for about seven
months. As to the stocks and the check for them, plaintiff kept
this intact and the Court ordered the defendant to endorse it
and plaintiff to cash the same and return the balance to defendant. (Tr.59).
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Therefore, we submit that the statement of appellant in his
brief that plaintiff received $20,000.00 in property, is wholly
misleading and untrue.
Inasmuch as Counsel has ·chosen to submit considerable
material dehors the trial Court record, (e. g. "defendant understands plaintiff is working at the present . . ." App. Brief
p. 11 - which statement is wholly untrue -) the foregoing
statement of fact, taken entirely from the record, is
submitted. Such extraneous and prejudcicial materials sulbmitted by appellant are, of course, to be accorded no probative
value by the Appellate Court.
We call this Honorable Court's attention to the fact that
plaintiff has received nothing from defendant since the entry
of this decree; that in addition thereto she has been required
to engage counsel to respond to defendant's appeal and to
represent her in this Court. Under the provisions of Sec. 30-3-3
U.C.A. (1953) plaintiff should be allowed a reasonable sum with
which to pay her counsel for his appearance in this Court. It
is submitted that $300.00 is a reasonable sum to be allowed
plaintiff for the use and benefit of her counsel herein. (Dahlberg
v. Dahlberg 77 Utah 157, 292 P.214 (1930).

CONCLUSION
We submit that nowhere in the record does it appear that
defendant and appelant was unfairly treated, or that there was
any abuse of the discretionary power of the trial Court in its
division of the property. Defendant and appellant has seen
fit to break up this marriage with no apparent reason whatsot,ver other than his infatuation with another man's wife. Ap-
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pellant's suggestion that the properties the parties had acquired
were his own to be taken to his new wife and the interests of
his old wife disregarded are so unconscionable as to be undeserving of comment. The trial Judge very carefully considered this matter and we invite this Honorable Court to examine
his statement from the bench in reaching his ruling (Tr.57).
In conclusion, Respondent urges this Court affirm the
decree of the lower Court and award to plaintiff and Respondent
herein, her costs and a reasonable attorney's fee for the use
and benefit of her counsel. (It is suggested that $300.00 is a
reasonable sum to be so allowed.)
Respectfully Submitted,
LA MAR DUNCAN,
ADAM M. DUNCAN,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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